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ABSTRACT 
South Africa has three statutory debt relief mechanisms in place to assist over-indebted 
consumers. These include debt review in terms of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005, 
administration orders in terms of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 and sequestration in 
terms of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. Of these three mechanisms, sequestration in terms 
of the Insolvency Act is the only mechanism in South Africa which provides for the statutory 
discharge of unpaid debts. However, the requirements to enter into this procedure are 
stringent and as a result many debtors do not have access to the procedure.  It is therefore 
important to compare South Africa’s natural persons’ insolvency regime to international best 
practices and guidelines, to establish which discharge principles can be incorporated or 
adopted into South Africa’s insolvency regime. This paper will examine the effectiveness of 
the discharge principles in South Africa, in light of the World Bank Report on the Treatment 
of the Insolvency of Natural Persons and the discharge principles applicable in foreign 
jurisdictions. South Africa’s debt relief mechanisms will be compared to the United States of 
America, England and Wales, New Zealand, Ireland and Japan. The discharge principles 
applicable in these foreign jurisdictions will be highlighted in order to establish which 
practices South Africa can adopt into its insolvency regime, in order to better assist over-
indebted consumers to obtain a fresh start and a better financial future. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
‘Society should not reward the cautious man who buries his talent and takes no chances; it 
most emphatically should do everything in its power to assist the man who creates jobs – the 
man who strives to turn his one talent into ten – even if he fails in the attempt.’1 
1.1 Background 
According to the World Bank Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons,2 
‘one of the principal purposes of an insolvency system for natural persons is to re-establish 
the debtor’s economic capability, in other words, economic rehabilitation.’3 This can be 
achieved through an effective personal insolvency regime that assists over-indebted 
consumers to return to a productive economic life.4 The most effective way to provide relief 
to debtors is through the discharge of unpaid debts.5 
Rehabilitation after sequestration is the only mechanism in South Africa that provides debtors 
with the discharge of pre-sequestration debts.6 However, discharge is merely a consequence 
of rehabilitation and it is not guaranteed.7 Sequestration is regulated by the Insolvency Act,8 
and has remained largely creditor-orientated despite the worldwide trend to accommodate 
over-indebted consumers.9 This is clear from the entry requirements for the sequestration 
                                                          
1 M Rochelle ‘Lowering the Penalties for failure: Using the Insolvency Law as a Tool for Spurring Economic 
Growth; the American Experience, and Possible uses for South Africa’ J. S. Afri. L. (1996) 315. 
2 Working Group on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons Report on the treatment of the 
insolvency of natural persons (Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes Task Force World Bank) available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGILD/Resources/WBInsolvencyOfNaturalPersonsReport_01_11_13.pdf 
accessed on 10/07/2017. Hereinafter referred to as ‘the World Bank Report’ or ‘Report’. 
3 Ibid para 359. 
4 J M Garrido ‘The Role of Personal Insolvency Law in Economic Development: An Introduction to the World 
Bank Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons’ in Hassane Cisse, N R Madhava Menon, 
Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Vincent O Nmehielle (eds) The World Bank Legal Review, Volume 5: Fostering 
Development through Opportunity, Inclusion, and Equity (2013) 111. 
5 The World Bank Report (note 2 above) para 360. 
6 A Boraine and M Roestoff ‘The Treatment of Insolvency of Natural Persons in South African Law – An Appeal 
for a Balanced and Integrated Approach’ in Hassane Cisse, N R Madhava Menon, Marie-Claire Cordonier 
Segger, Vincent O Nmehielle (eds) The World Bank Legal Review, Volume 5: Fostering Development through 
Opportunity, Inclusion, and Equity (2013) 95. See also M Roestoff ‘Rehabilitasie in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
verbruikersinsolvensiereg: internasionale tendense en riglyne’ LitNet Akademies (2016) 600. 
7 H Coetzee ‘A Comparative Reappraisal of Debt Relief Measures for Natural Person Debtors in South Africa’ 
LLD thesis University of Pretoria (2015) available at 
https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/52372/Coetzee_Comparative_2015.pdf?sequence=1 
accessed on 25/08/2017, 142. 
8 Act 24 of 1936. Hereinafter referred to as the Insolvency Act. 
9 M Roestoff and H Coetzee ‘Consumer Debt Relief in South Africa: Lessons from America and England; and 
suggestions for the Way Forward’ SA Merc LJ (2012) 53. 
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procedure, which includes sequestration having to be to the ‘advantage of creditors.’ 
According to Roestoff and Coetzee, ‘the primary object of the South African Insolvency Act is 
to ensure an orderly and fair distribution of the debtor’s assets in circumstances where these 
assets are insufficient to satisfy all the creditors’ claims.’10  As Erasmus J explained the 
position, in BP Southern African (Pty) Ltd v Furstenburg: ‘[T]he whole tenor of the Act, 
inasmuch as it directly relates to sequestration proceedings, is aimed at obtaining a pecuniary 
benefit for creditors.’11 As a result of this ‘advantage of creditors’ requirement, it is difficult 
for over-indebted consumers to access the sequestration process in terms of the Insolvency 
Act and it is therefore difficult for these consumers to obtain debt relief. Furthermore, once 
they have entered the sequestration proceedings, the over-indebted consumer has to wait 
an unnecessarily long period before they can be automatically discharged.  It therefore 
becomes clear that the Insolvency Act does not provide over-indebted consumers with 
adequate debt relief and debt relief is merely a consequence of the Insolvency Act. 12  
While the debtor also has access to other debt relief mechanisms, namely debt review in 
terms of the National Credit Act13 and administration orders in terms of section 74 of the 
Magistrates’ Courts Act,14 these procedures do not provide for the automatic discharge of 
unpaid debts. According to a research report on Administration Orders compiled by the 
Centre for Advanced Corporate and Insolvency Law at the University of Pretoria, ‘due to its 
stringent requirements for sequestration on the one hand, and due to the limited alternatives 
to sequestration available on the other hand, the formal discharge is only available to an 
exclusive few.’15 This means that ‘low income low asset’ (LILA) and ‘no income no asset’ 
(NINA) debtors in South Africa have limited options with regard to debt relief and are exclude 
from most of the statutory debt relief mechanisms. 
According to the World Bank Report, there are three elements necessary for an effective 
rehabilitation procedure: ‘First, the debtor has to be freed from excessive debt… Second, the 
                                                          
10 Roestoff and Coetzee (note 9 above) 55. 
11 BP Southern African (Pty) Ltd v Furstenburg [1966] 1 SA (O) 717, 720. 
12 Roestoff and Coetzee (note 9 above) 55. 
13 Act 34 of 2005. Hereinafter referred to as the NCA. 
14 Act 32 of 1944. Hereinafter referred to as the MCA. 
15 Centre for Advanced Corporate and Insolvency Law – University of Pretoria Interim Research Report on the 
Review of Administration Orders in terms of Section 74 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 (May 2002) 
83. See also in this regard M Roestoff and S Renke ‘Debt Relief for consumers – the interaction between 
insolvency and consumer protection legislation’ (part 2) Obiter (2006) 98, 100. 
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debtor should be treated on an equal basis with non-debtors after receiving relief (the 
principle of non-discrimination). Third, the debtor should be able to avoid becoming 
excessively indebted again in the future, which may require some attempt to change debtors’ 
attitudes concerning proper credit use.’16 
The World Bank Report recommends the ‘fresh start’ principle, or straight discharge, as being 
the most effective form of relief.17 This fresh start principle should entail both the discharge 
of pre-insolvency debt and provision for debtors of prospects of an improved financial 
future.18 According to the Second Principle, established in the INSOL International Consumer 
Debt Report II, a fresh start is ‘based on the principle that the debtor should be able to begin 
afresh, free from past financial obligations and should not suffer indefinitely.’19 The World 
Bank Report also envisages an ‘earned new start’ through repayment plans that last for a 
period of three to five years.20 The World Bank Report however points out that certain courts, 
which are not specifically identified in the Report, have found these minimum payments, 
which are required by the repayment plan, ‘to be discriminatory against debtors with little or 
no means.’21 
A study of the insolvency laws available in South Africa compared to other countries, such as 
the United States of America (USA), England and Wales, New Zealand, Ireland and Japan, 
indicate that these countries’ insolvency laws are more debtor-friendly and the debt relief 
offered to indebted consumers are more in line with the World Bank Report’s 
recommendations. 
The question that therefore arises is whether the discharge principles, which are applicable 
in South African law, provide debtors with adequate debt relief and whether they are 
consistent with the discharge principles envisaged in the Report. South African insolvency law 
is outdated22 and South Africa can learn from other jurisdictions in order to better assist over-
                                                          
16 The World Bank Report (note 2 above) para 359. 
17 Ibid para 360. 
18 Roestoff (note 6 above) 596. 
19 INSOL International Consumer Debt Report II: Report of findings and recommendations (2011) 15. 
20 The World Bank Report (note 2 above) para 361. 
21 Ibid para 362. 
22 A Boraine and M Roestoff ‘Revisiting the state of consumer insolvency in South Africa after twenty years: 
The courts’ approach, international guidelines and an appeal for urgent law reform’ (Part 1) 77 THRHR (2014) 
351, 352. 
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indebted consumers to obtain a fresh start and to become productive, educated members of 
society. 
1.2 Statement of purpose and research questions 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse South Africa’s personal insolvency and consumer debt 
relief regimes and to look at whether the discharge principles in place offer appropriate relief 
to over-indebted consumers. This will be carried out in light of the World Bank Report and 
the international trends and guidelines applicable in other jurisdictions. A comparative 
analysis of the discharge principles in place in the USA, England and Wales, New Zealand, 
Ireland and Japan will take place. This paper will look at whether South Africa can implement 
or adopt some of these principles in order to better assist over-indebted consumers. 
The questions which I will need to ask in order to achieve this purpose are: 
1. What are the current discharge principles applicable in South African insolvency law 
and how are these principles applied by South African courts?  
2. Do the discharge principles offered by South African insolvency law offer appropriate 
debt relief to over-indebted consumers?  
3. What recommendations does the World Bank Report make with regard to discharge 
principles? 
4. How do foreign jurisdictions deal with the discharge of debts?  
5. Which discharge principles can South Africa introduce or adopt from foreign 
jurisdictions to bring South Africa in line with the World Bank Report’s 
recommendations? 
1.3 Limitations  
The institutionally restricted length of this short dissertation does not allow for an in-depth 
analysis of the procedural requirements for each debt relief measure offered in each 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, while LILA and NINA debtors are mentioned, this aspect will not be 
discussed in great detail due to imposed length constraints. Therefore, the main focus will be 
on the discharge principles applicable and the basic principles relating to access 
requirements. 
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1.4 Rationale for the study  
The number of over-indebted consumers in South Africa has increased over the last few 
decades as a result of the increase in credit lending.23 Many debtors get caught in a vicious 
cycle of having to pay off their debts and turn to sequestration as a form of relief. However, 
the sequestration process has stringent creditor-orientated requirements which are 
unattainable for many debtors and as a result these debtors are unable to obtain a discharge 
of debts.  Furthermore, South African case law has confirmed that debt relief is not a main 
aim of the Insolvency Act and that the discharge of pre-sequestration debts is merely a 
consequence of rehabilitation.24 This creditor-oriented approach is in contrast with the 
‘world-wide trend to provide debt relief to “honest but unfortunate debtors”.’25  
This study is therefore vital for over-indebted consumers, for creditors and for society, which 
would benefit from over-indebted consumers attaining a discharge and being economically 
rehabilitated. Where debtors are unable to repay their debts, and are trapped in never-ending 
debt, this can contribute to an economic meltdown.26  
According to Boraine and Roestoff, many debtors are treated unequally and are left without 
recourse in the form of a statutory discharge.27 Rochelle suggests that a fresh start policy is 
an effective tool to improve economic growth and development.28 It is therefore of utmost 
importance that South African citizens are offered adequate debt relief which enables them 
to escape from the debt trap in which they are stuck, but which will also educate them to not 
repeat the same mistakes again. 
1.5 Research methodology  
A qualitative approach will be adopted for this paper and it will make reference to legislation, 
literature and reported judgments. Reference to legislation will include both the debt relief 
                                                          
23 P N Stoop ‘South African Consumer Credit Policy: Measures Indirectly Aimed at Preventing Consumer Over-
indebtedness’ SA Mercantile L.J (2009) 365. 
24 Boraine and Roestoff (note 22 above) 355. 
25 A Boraine and M Roestoff ‘Revisiting the state of consumer insolvency in South Africa after twenty years: 
The courts’ approach, international guidelines and an appeal for urgent law reform’ (Part 2) 77 THRHR (2014) 
527, 542. 
26 World Development Movement ‘Third world debt’ available at 
http://www.wdm.org.uk/category/issues/third-world-debt accessed on 15/07/2017.  
27 Boraine and Roestoff (note 6 above) 109. 
28 Rochelle (note 1 above) 315. 
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legislation in place in South Africa, as well as in foreign jurisdictions including USA, England 
and Wales, New Zealand, Ireland and Japan. Reference will also be made to the World Bank 
Report throughout this paper.  
1.6 Conceptual framework 
The Insolvency Act is the only mechanism that offers over-indebted consumers debt relief in 
the form of an automatic discharge. The Insolvency Act however has an ‘advantage of 
creditors’ requirement which creates an obstacle for debtors who wish to use the 
sequestration process as a debt relief measure. Furthermore, the period to be discharged is 
unnecessarily long and the debtor still has to pay off a portion of their debt before they can 
obtain a discharge. Debtors may also enter into a repayment plan in terms of the NCA and 
the MCA, but these mechanisms do not specify a time period which means that it could take 
years before the debtor obtains a discharge. South Africa also does not offer a debt relief 
mechanism that caters specifically for low, or no, income earners. It is thus imperative to 
study the World Bank Report and the law in foreign jurisdictions in order to look at the 
worldwide trends which can be adopted into South African insolvency law. Over-indebted 
consumers in South Africa should be afforded a level of mercy which would enable them to 
be rehabilitated and to be productive citizens of society once again. 
1.7 Overview of chapters 
This, the first chapter, introduces the topic and gives a brief background of insolvency law in 
South Africa. The second chapter will deal with the debt relief mechanisms available in South 
Africa, with particular emphasis on the discharge principles involved. It looks at the common 
law compromise, administration orders in terms of the MCA, debt review in terms of the NCA 
and sequestration in terms of the Insolvency Act. It will also discuss the courts’ approach to 
rehabilitation and the proposed amendments to legislation that provides for South Africa’s 
debt relief measures. Chapter Three will discuss the debt relief mechanisms available in USA, 
England and Wales, New Zealand, Ireland and Japan, focusing on the discharge principles 
applicable. Chapter Four will compare South Africa’s discharge principles to those applicable 
in foreign jurisdictions. The final chapter will consist of a conclusion as well as 
recommendations for the way forward in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER TWO: DISCHARGE PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1 Introduction  
As previously indicated, there are three statutory debt relief mechanisms available for natural 
persons in South Africa, namely the NCA, the MCA and the Insolvency Act. The common law 
compromise is also available for debtors. In this chapter, each of these debt relief measures 
will be discussed. First, the common law compromise will be discussed briefly. The 
administration procedure in terms of the MCA, debt review in terms of the NCA and the 
sequestration procedure in terms of the Insolvency Act will then be outlined. This chapter will 
then go on to discuss how rehabilitation is dealt with by the South African courts. Finally, it 
will look at any proposals put forward in an attempt to improve debt relief in South Africa. 
2.2 The common law compromise 
The common law compromise is based on the contractual principle of consent and is a debt 
restructuring plan that is entered into between the debtor and his creditors.29 The parties 
reach a compromise with regard to the debtor’s payment options and, depending on the 
terms of the agreement, the parties may agree on the full or partial settlement of the debtors’ 
obligations.30 In order to be effective, all of the creditors must accept the compromise.31 A 
common law compromise may be entered into after a provisional order of sequestration has 
been granted, but this is conditional upon the provisional order being discharged.32 
While the common law compromise may be a viable option for the debtor in theory, it is not 
a realistic option as many debtors may not be in a financial position to pay off their debts. 
Furthermore, creditors are not always willing to agree on an unregulated common law 
compromise due to the risks involved. The common law compromise is also not attractive to 
debtors as it does not provide them with a discharge of unpaid debts. 
 
 
                                                          
29 Boraine and Roestoff (note 6 above) 105. 
30 R H Christie and GB Bradfield Christie’s The Law of contract in South Africa 6th ed Lexis Nexis Butterworths 
(2011) 473. 
31 Coetzee (note 7 above) 290. 
32 E Bertelsmann et al Mars: The Law of Insolvency in South Africa, 9th ed Juta & Co Ltd (2008) 547. 
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2.3 Administration Order in terms of section 74 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 
Section 74 of the MCA enables a debtor to apply for an administration order, provided that 
he is unable to pay the amount of any judgment issued against him, or to meet his financial 
obligations, and provided that he has insufficient assets to satisfy the judgment debt or 
obligations.33 This procedure is only available for debtors whose debts do not exceed 
R50 000.34 The effect of an administration order is that the creditors will be compelled to 
accept a debt rearrangement in terms of which the debtor will pay his debts in instalments.35 
Once an administration order has been granted by the magistrate’s court the debtor must 
make regular payments to an administrator, who then uses the amounts received to pay the 
creditors.36 The order lapses, or is discharged, once the debtor has paid the administration 
costs, all debts subject to the administration order and the interest thereon.37 
This debt relief mechanism does not specify a certain repayment period and it does not 
provide debtors with any automatic discharge of unpaid debts.38 In order to earn their 
discharge, the debtor has to make all payments in terms of the administration order. This may 
cause the debtor to become ‘locked into the process indefinitely.’39 Boraine and Roestoff 
argue that the lack of discharge and maximum repayment period, as well as the 
administration costs and interest involved, may ‘cause the amount of debt to escalate to such 
an extent that many debtors never get out of debt.’40 Furthermore, debtors who owe more 
than R50 000 do not have access to this debt rearrangement plan41 so only a limited number 
of debtors may access this mechanism. Malanje submits that a higher monetary cap would 
include those debtors that are excluded from the Insolvency Act and thus from 
rehabilitation.42 Boraine and Roestoff further state that the debtor must have a regular 
                                                          
33 MCA S74(1)(a). 
34 Ibid S74(1)(b). 
35 Ibid S74(1). 
36 Ibid S74I & 74J. 
37 Ibid S74U. 
38 A Boraine, C Van Heerden and M Roestoff ‘A comparison between formal debt administration and debt 
review – the pros and cons of these measures and suggestions for law reform’ (Part 1) De Jure (2012) 80, 92. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Boraine and Roestoff (note 6 above) 100. 
41 Boraine, Van Heerden and Roestoff (note 38 above) 92. 
42 N J Malanje ‘The impact of administration orders as a redress mechanism for over-indebted consumers: a 
critical analysis’ in Nejdat D et al Globalizing business for the next century: visualizing and developing 
contemporary approaches to harness future opportunities (2013) 629. 
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income in order to enter into the administration proceedings because a monthly payment has 
to be made to the administrator.43 This means that people with low or no income would not 
obtain debt relief from the administration order which necessitates the debtor having a 
steady income in order to pay the debts in full over an extended period. 
2.4 Debt review in terms of the National Credit Act 
The objective of the NCA is to provide debt relief to over-indebted consumers.44 The purpose 
of the NCA, as set out in section 3, is to address and prevent over-indebtedness of consumers, 
and to provide mechanisms for resolving over-indebtedness based on the principle of 
satisfaction by the consumer of all responsible financial obligations.45 The NCA addresses 
over-indebtedness by providing a system of debt restructuring in order to ensure the 
satisfaction of consumer obligations under credit agreements.46 Therefore the purpose of the 
NCA is the full satisfaction of debts and not to offer a discharge of unpaid debts.47  
Section 86 of the NCA enables debtors to initiate debt review proceedings by applying to a 
debt counsellor for the purposes of being declared over-indebted. If the debt counsellor 
reasonably concludes that the consumer is over-indebted, the debt counsellor may make a 
recommendation to the magistrates’ court that one or more of the consumer’s obligations, 
in terms of a credit agreement, be re-arranged.48 This debt rearrangement plan enables the 
debtor to pay off his debts over an extended period of time.49 
The NCA has also introduced consumer counselling, but this does not offer traditional 
consumer education to debtors and the role of the debt counsellor is limited.50 Debt 
counselling in terms of the NCA is also not linked to sequestration proceedings.51 
Debt review has a number of problems. Much like the administration order, the NCA does not 
provide debtors with any discharge of unpaid debts and is not subject to a maximum payment 
                                                          
43 Boraine and Roestoff (note 6 above) 100. 
44 C Van Heerden and A Boraine ‘The Interaction between the Debt Relief Measures in the National Credit Act 
34 of 2005 and Aspects of Insolvency Law’ Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal (2009) 22, 22. 
45 NCA S 3(g). 
46 Ibid S 3(i). 
47 Boraine and Roestoff (note 6 above) 101. 
48 NCA S 86(7)(c)(ii). 
49 Ibid S 86(7)(ii)(aa). 
50 J Calitz ‘Developments in the United States’ Consumer Bankruptcy Law: A South African Perspective’ Obiter 
(2007) 397, 414. 
51 Ibid. 
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period.52 This is in accordance with the NCA’s objective of addressing and preventing debt 
relief subject to the principle ‘of satisfaction by the consumer of all responsible financial 
obligations’.53 The absence of discharge provisions in the NCA has led to criticism of the debt 
review process due to ‘its inability to provide effective and efficient debt relief to over-
indebted consumers’.54 Furthermore, the lack of time periods may cause the debtor to remain 
in debt indefinitely.55 Boraine and Roestoff describe the procedure as being ‘cumbersome, 
costly, and slow.’56 The procedure is also restricted to debts incurred under a credit 
agreement. 
2.5 Sequestration in terms of the Insolvency Act 
2.5.1 Introduction 
Sequestration in terms of the Insolvency Act is the primary debt relief mechanism in South 
Africa and is the only statutory mechanism that provides for the discharge of pre-
sequestration debts.57 Discharge is however not the main aim and is merely a consequence 
of sequestration.58 In Ex Parte Ford and Two Similar Cases,59 the Court stated that the primary 
objective of the Insolvency Act is to benefit the creditors and not to grant debt relief to 
harassed debtors. Mabe and Evans describe the Insolvency Act as being ‘creditor friendly’ and 
‘static.’60 Roestoff and Coetzee point out that even though it is not a primary objective, debt 
relief is a consequence of the Insolvency Act, because ‘rehabilitation in terms of the Act 
results in a discharge of all pre-sequestration debts.’61 
2.5.2 Advantage of creditors  
The Insolvency Act provides debt relief through sequestration of the debtor’s estate. There 
are two ways in which a natural person’s estate may be sequestrated, namely voluntary 
                                                          
52 M Roestoff ‘Ferris v Firstrand Bank Ltd 2014 3 SA 39 (CC)’ De Jure (2016) 134. 
53 NCA S 3(g). 
54 Roestoff (note 52 above) 135.  
55 Boraine and Roestoff (note 6 above) 104. 
56 Ibid. 
57 H Coetzee and M Roestoff ‘Consumer Debt Relief in South Africa – Should the Insolvency System Provide for 
NINA Debtors? Lessons from New Zealand’ 22 Int. Insolv. Rev. (2013) 188, 189. 
58 Ibid. 
59 2009 (3) SA 376 (WCC), para 21. 
60 Z Mabe and RG Evans ‘Abuse of Sequestration Proceedings in South Africa Revisited’ SA Merc LJ (2014) 652, 
665. 
61 Roestoff and Coetzee (note 9 above) 55. 
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surrender or compulsory sequestration. An application for voluntary surrender is initiated by 
the debtor himself, while an application for compulsory sequestration is brought by one or 
more creditors. The High Court has jurisdiction to hear both these applications. If the court 
grants the sequestration order, the estate of the debtor vests in the Master, and thereafter 
in the trustee upon appointment.62 The order creates a stay on all civil proceedings and affects 
the status of the debtor in that he may not hold various offices.63  
In an application for voluntary surrender, the applicant must satisfy the court that it will be 
to the advantage of creditors that his estate is sequestrated.64 This is a more stringent 
requirement to prove than with an application for compulsory sequestration where the 
creditor merely has to show that ‘there is reason to believe’ that the sequestration will be to 
the advantage of creditors.65 A possible reason for this is that a debtor can be expected to 
have access to a detailed account of his financial position, whereas a creditor would not.66 
Another reason for the more stringent requirement is to prevent debtors from abusing the 
process and using it as a way to escape liability.67 
The ‘advantage of creditors’ requirement creates a stumbling block to debtors who have to 
prove that the sequestration will ‘yield at least a not negligible dividend.’68 On the other hand, 
all the creditor has to prove to bring an application is that ‘there is a reasonable prospect – 
not necessarily a likelihood, but a prospect which is not too remote – that some pecuniary 
benefit will result to creditors.’69 Coetzee and Roestoff describe these entry requirements as 
being ‘of such a nature that most debtors are effectively excluded and therefore bound to 
their desperate plight.’70 This requirement prevents many debtors from entering the 
sequestration process and therefore creates a barrier for their rehabilitation. It is not clear 
what dividend would constitute an ‘advantage of creditors’ but in Ex parte Ogunlaja71 and in 
                                                          
62 Bertelsmann et al (note 32 above) 17. 
63 Coetzee (note 7 above) 108. 
64 Insolvency Act S 6(1). 
65 Ibid S 12(1)(c). 
66 Hillhouse v Stott; Freban Investments (Pty) Ltd v Itzken; Botha v Botha 1990 (4) SA 580 (W) 581. 
67 R Sharrock et al Hockley’s Insolvency Law 9th ed Juta & Co Ltd (2012) 20. 
68 Ex parte Steenkamp 1996 (3) SA 822 (W); Meskin and Co v Friedman 1948 2 SA 555 (W) 559. 
69 Meskin v Friedman 1948 (2) SA 555 (W). 
70 Coetzee and Roestoff (note 57 above) 189. 
71 2010 JDR 0035 (GNP). 
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Ex parte Cloete,72 it was held that in the North Gauteng High Court the dividend should be at 
least 20 cents in the rand for each concurrent creditor. 
2.5.3 Excluded property  
Property exemptions also offer relief to debtors wishing to obtain a fresh start after 
undergoing sequestration.73 Generally, all property belonging to the debtor, at the date of 
sequestration, forms part of the insolvent estate.74 This includes property which the insolvent 
may acquire or which may accrue to him during sequestration.75 The Insolvency Act, however, 
provides that the wearing apparel, bedding, household furniture, tools and other essential 
means of subsistence are excluded from sequestration.76 According to Roestoff, ‘[h]ierdie 
uitsluitings bevorder die uitendelike rehabilitasie van die insolvente vir sover dit hom of haar 
in staat stel om minstens ’n basiese lewenstandaard te handhaaf en om die pad van finansiële 
herstel aan te pak…’77 The insolvent may also keep any pension he is entitled to,78 any 
compensation for loss or damage which he may have suffered,79 and any remuneration or 
reward for work done prior to sequestration.80 
2.5.4 Rehabilitation  
It has been mentioned that rehabilitation, after sequestration, is the only way in which a 
debtor can obtain the discharge of unpaid debts.81 The Insolvency Act provides for the 
rehabilitation of insolvent debtors by way of automatic rehabilitation or by way of a court 
order.82  
There are different circumstances within which an insolvent may make an application to court 
for rehabilitation. Section 124(1) allows an insolvent to bring an immediate ex parte 
application for rehabilitation where an offer of composition has been made and accepted by 
the creditors, as envisaged by section 119(7), and after obtaining a certificate from the Master 
                                                          
72 [2013] ZAFSHC 45. 
73 The World Bank Report (note 2 above) para 123. 
74 Insolvency Act S 20(2)(a). 
75 Ibid S 20(2)(b). 
76 Ibid S 82(6). 
77 Roestoff (note 6 above) 602. 
78 Insolvency Act S 23(7). 
79 Ibid S 23(8). 
80 Ibid S 23(9). 
81 See 1.1 above. 
82 Sharrock et al (note 67 above) 208. 
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to that effect, provided that payment has been made and that not less than three weeks’ 
notice of intention to make the application was given in the Gazette and to the trustees. 
An insolvent who does not qualify for rehabilitation in terms of section 124(1) may make an 
application in terms of section 124(2). Section 124(2)(a) permits an insolvent to apply for 
rehabilitation after twelve months have elapsed since the confirmation by the Master of the 
first account in the estate. If the insolvent’s estate has been previously sequestrated, the 
insolvent must wait for three years to elapse before applying for rehabilitation in terms of 
section 124(2)(b). Roestoff notes that South Africa does not place a limitation on the number 
of times that a person can obtain a rehabilitation order, under the Insolvency Act.83 However, 
an insolvent, that has been previously sequestrated, has to wait a period of three years before 
reapplying for rehabilitation.84 Section 124(2)(c) provides that if the insolvent has been 
previously convicted of a fraudulent act in relation to the existing or any previous insolvency, 
then he must wait five years, from the date of sequestration, to apply for rehabilitation. A 
positive recommendation by the Master is required where an application is brought within 
four years.85 Section 124(3) permits an insolvent to apply for rehabilitation after six months 
from the date of sequestration if no claim has been proved against his estate, if his estate has 
not been previously sequestrated and if he has not been convicted of any fraudulent act in 
relation to the existing insolvency. Section 124(2) and (3) of the Insolvency Act provides that 
the insolvent must give not less than six weeks’ notice of his intention to apply for 
rehabilitation to the Master and to the trustee, in writing, and by advertisement in the 
Gazette. The debtor may apply to the court for rehabilitation at any time after the Master has 
confirmed a plan of distribution which provides for the full payment of all claims as well as 
interest thereon and the costs of sequestration.86 
Section 124(5) permits the insolvent to apply for rehabilitation after confirmation by the 
Master of a plan of distribution providing for the payment in full of all claims proved against 
the insolvents estate, together with interest thereon and all the costs of sequestration. The 
                                                          
83 Roestoff (note 6 above) 601. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Insolvency Act S 124(2). 
86 Ibid S 124(5). 
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insolvent must give not less than three weeks’ notice of his intention to apply for 
rehabilitation to the Master and to the trustee, in writing. 
An insolvent that has not been rehabilitated within ten years from the date of sequestration 
of his estate shall be deemed to be rehabilitated after the expiry of such a period unless an 
application is brought by an interested person opposing the rehabilitation of the insolvent.87  
The effect of rehabilitation of an insolvent person is that it puts an end to his status as an 
insolvent, it relieves the insolvent of every disability which resulted from the sequestration 
and it discharges all debts of the insolvent, which were due or which arose before the 
sequestration, save for any debts which arose out of any fraud on the part of the insolvent.88 
The debtor is also not discharged from paying maintenance.89 According to Bertelsmann et 
al, the wording of section 129(1) of the Insolvency Act suggests that a complete discharge of 
all pre-sequestration debts is afforded to the debtor.90  
2.5.5 The courts’ approach  
The courts’ approach when deciding whether to grant rehabilitation orders to insolvent 
debtors may be described as ‘one of greater tolerance’.91 An insolvent does not have a right 
to rehabilitation and the court has discretion to refuse, postpone or grant the application for 
rehabilitation, either unconditionally or subject to certain conditions.92 ‘The essential enquiry 
is whether in the light of all the relevant facts – ie, the applicant’s interests, the creditors’ 
interests, whether or not they have proved claims, and the commercial public at large – the 
insolvent is a fit and proper person to participate in commercial life free of any constraints 
and disabilities.’93  
In Ex Parte Harris94 Gamble J refers to the test formulated by Wessels J, stating that an 
applicant wishing to be rehabilitated must ‘satisfy the court that he is a fit and proper person 
to be permitted to trade with the public on the same basis as any other honest business 
                                                          
87 Insolvency Act S 127A(1). 
88 Ibid S 129 (1). 
89 Boraine and Roestoff (note 6 above) 98. 
90 Bertelsmann et al (note 32 above) see footnote 417. 
91 Ibid 575. 
92 Insolvency Act S 127(7). See also Ex parte Snooke 2014 (5) SA 426 (FB).  
93 Ex parte Snooke 2014 (5) SA 426 (FB) para 33. 
94 Ex parte Harris (Fairhaven Country Estate (Pty) Ltd as intervening party) [2016] 1 All SA 764 (WCC). 
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person.’95 This means that if the applicant conducted himself in a negligent manner then he 
ought not to be rehabilitated unless he can show his intention to adopt better methods.96 
The Court is thus not only concerned with the interests of past creditors but is also concerned 
with the applicant’s future behaviour.97 ‘The effect of rehabilitation is to restore him fully to 
the marketplace and, more importantly, to the obtaining of credit’.98 
2.6 Law reform initiatives  
2.6.1 Draft Insolvency Bill   
The South African Law Reform Commission (the Commission) recognised the need for change 
in South African insolvency law and in 2000 they published a report, including a Draft 
Insolvency Bill.99 In 2010, the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 
completed a working document which contained the Draft Insolvency Bill.100 If this Draft 
Insolvency Bill is enacted, it will replace the current Insolvency Act in South Africa.101  
One of the proposals put forward in the Draft Insolvency Bill, is for the inclusion of a pre-
liquidation composition which will serve as an alternative debt relief procedure.102 Pre-
liquidation compositions are beneficial to debtors who are unable to prove the stringent 
‘advantage of creditors’ requirement and are thus excluded from the sequestration 
                                                          
95 Ex parte Harris (see note 94 above) para 84. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ex parte Le Roux 1996 (2) SA 419 (C). 
98 Ibid. 
99 South African Law Reform Commission Project 63 Report on the review of the law of insolvency: Draft 
Insolvency Bill and explanatory memorandum (2000) Volume 1: Explanatory Memorandum; Volume 2: Draft 
Insolvency Bill, available at http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/reports/r_prj63_insolv_2000apr.pdf accessed on 
20/11/2017.  Boraine and Roestoff (note 25 above) 527. 
100 Ibid. The most recent unofficial version of the Draft Insolvency Bill is a working document compiled by 
Tienie Cronje in February 2015. 
101 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development ‘Draft Insolvency Bill Under Construction’ available 
at http://www.sabinetlaw.co.za/justice-and-constitution/articles/draft-insolvency-bill-under-construction 
accessed on 20/11/2017. 
102 An unofficial working copy of the proposed Insolvency Bill, containing an explanatory memorandum, is on 
file with the author and is available, upon request, from Mr MB (Tienie) Cronje (mccronje@justice.gov.za), 
researcher at the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development Unofficial working draft) (Hereinafter referred to as ‘Draft Insolvency Bill’ and 
‘Explanatory memorandum’ respectively). Boraine and Roestoff (note 25 above) 527. See also Coetzee (note 7 
above) 247. 
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process.103 According to Coetzee, ‘the procedure is aimed at negotiated settlements between 
parties.’104 
Pre-liquidation compositions are available to natural persons whose debts do not exceed 
R200 000 and who are unable to pay their debts.105 The composition becomes binding on all 
creditors if it is accepted by the majority in number and two-thirds in value of the concurrent 
creditors who vote on the composition.106 This is in contrast with the common law 
compromise where full cooperation is required from all the creditors in order for the 
compromise to be binding.107 
If the composition is not accepted by the majority of the creditors, and the debtor is not able 
to pay more than what he offered in the proposed composition, the proceedings will cease 
and the debtor will be in the position that they were in prior to the commencement of the 
procedure.108 The debtor may thereafter apply to the Master for a discharge of debts, other 
than secured or preferred debts, if the Master is satisfied that the administrator and the 
creditors were given notice of the application, the proposed composition was the best offer 
which the debtor could make, the debtor’s inability to pay his debts in full is not due to 
criminal or inappropriate behaviour, and the debtor does not qualify for an administration 
order under section 74 of the MCA.109 According to the explanatory memorandum, this 
provision affords debtors ‘who do not qualify for liquidation an opportunity for a fresh start 
which entails a discharge of debts.’110 If enacted, the Draft Insolvency Bill would allow 
debtors, with little or no income, an opportunity to obtain a discharge, without entering into 
the formal sequestration process. Steyn submits that one advantage of the proposed pre-
liquidation composition is that it would apply to all types of debts and it would not be limited 
to debts arising out of credit agreements.111 
                                                          
103 Coetzee (note 7 above) 247. 
104 Ibid 250. 
105 Draft Insolvency Bill (note 102 above) S 118(1). 
106 Ibid S 118(17). 
107 See 2.2 above. 
108 Draft Insolvency Bill (note 102 above) S 118(22)(a). 
109 Ibid S 118(22)(b). 
110 Explanatory memorandum (note 102 above) 208. 
111 L Steyn ‘Sink or swim? Debt review’s ambivalent “lifeline” – a second sequel to “…a tale of two judgments” 
Nedbank v Andrews (240/2011) 2011 ZAECPEHC 29 (10 May 2011); Firstrand Bank Ltd v Evans 2011 4 SA 597 
(KZD) and Firstrand Bank Ltd v Janse Van Rensburg 2012 2 All SA 186 (ECP)’ Potchefstroom Electronic Law 
Journal (2012) 190, 221. 
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It is also worth mentioning that the Draft Insolvency Bill retains the ‘advantage of creditors’ 
requirement112 and there is no mention of reducing the discharge period for debtors who 
undergo liquidation. The reason that the Commission puts forward, in the explanatory 
memorandum, for not reducing the discharge period is as follows: 
The period of 10 years is somewhat arbitrary as would be any other period substituted 
for it. The only guideline is a vague feeling about what a proper period should be. 
Other countries have reduced their periods for "automatic" rehabilitation. 
Conceptually it makes sense to provide for different periods for different scenarios. 
However, simplicity is desirable in this regard and it is advisable for a simple rule that 
rehabilitation takes place after a fixed number of years unless there is a court order. 
In the light of the limited comments in this regard and the fact that the 10 year period 
in the present legislation has become relatively well-known, no shortening of the 
period is proposed.113 
2.6.2 Proposed Debt Relief Bill 
The National Assembly has recently granted the Trade and Industry Portfolio Committee (the 
Committee) permission to introduce a bill that will amend the National Credit Act.114 The 
Committee recognises that over-indebtedness is a challenge in South Africa and many people 
cannot afford to undergo debt review.115 They recognise that the current debt relief 
mechanisms in place in South Africa exclude vulnerable consumers, such as debtors in lower 
income groups.116 One of the objects of the proposed Debt Relief Bill is to provide debt relief 
to debtors who are unable to access any of the debt relief mechanisms currently in place in 
South Africa.117 
Part E of the proposed Debt Relief Bill provides relief, in the form of Debt Intervention, for 
debtors with no income, or with an income not exceeding R7500 per month, with no 
                                                          
112 Draft Insolvency Bill (note 102 above) S 3(8)(a)(ii). 
113 Explanatory memorandum (note 102 above) 197. 
114 ‘Debt Forgiveness’ available at https://pmg.org.za/page/Debtforgiveness accessed on 20/10/2017. 
115 The Department of Trade and Industry ‘Presentation to Portfolio Committee on the Proposed Draft National 
Credit Policy Review for Debt Relief and the National Credit Amendment Bill, 2017 Developed by the Portfolio 
Committee on Trade and Industry’ available at https://www.thedti.gov.za/parliament/2017/Debt_Relief.pdf 
accessed on 20/10/2017, 5. 
116 Memorandum on the Objects of the National Credit Amendment Bill, 2018 (GN 922, Government Gazette 
41274, 24 November 2017) 36. 
117 Ibid. 
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realisable assets and who are not subject to debt review.118 It also provides relief for disabled 
persons as well as minor or woman-headed households.119 The applicants total unsecured 
debts must not exceed an amount of R50 000.120 A debtor may only apply once for Debt 
Intervention.121 If the debtor qualifies for Debt Intervention, the Tribunal will suspend all 
qualifying credit agreements, in part or in full, for one year.122 This period can be extended 
for a further year, depending on the financial circumstances of the debtor.123 If, during the 
period of Debt Intervention, the financial position of the applicant has not sufficiently 
improved, the Tribunal will extinguish, in part or in full, the qualifying debts of the 
applicant.124 A debt intervention applicant may apply, at any time, for a rehabilitation order, 
provided that the applicant has fulfilled the obligations in terms of the debt intervention 
order.125 The Tribunal will grant the rehabilitation order if the applicant has shown that his 
financial position has improved.126 The proposed Debt Relief Bill also makes provision for the 
Minister to establish a financial literacy and budgeting skills programme to assist consumers 
in managing their financial position.127 The proposed Debt Relief Bill further makes it 
mandatory for consumers to take out credit life insurance where they enter into credit 
agreements exceeding six months and where the principal debt is less than R50 000.128 
2.7 Conclusion  
Of the three debt relief mechanisms available in South Africa, only the Insolvency Act provides 
debtors with a discharge of unpaid debts. Discharge is however only a consequence of 
rehabilitation in terms of the Insolvency Act. Furthermore, it is difficult for many consumers 
in South Africa, especially consumers with little or no income, to access sequestration as a 
debt relief measure, due to the ‘advantage of creditors’ requirement. Even though debtors 
have access to debt review in terms of the NCA and administration orders in terms of the 
MCA, these mechanisms do not offer a discharge of unpaid debts and there is no limit on how 
                                                          
118 National Credit Amendment Bill (GN 922, Government Gazette 41274, 24 November 2017) S 88A(1)(a). 
119 Ibid S 88A(1)(a). 
120 Ibid S 88A(2). 
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long the repayment plan will last for. As a result of this, South Africans are stuck in a vicious 
cycle of debt. Van Heerden and Boraine suggest that South African law needs to find a suitable 
alternative debt relief measure to insolvency law that will provide for the discharge of 
debts.129 If the proposals put forward in the Draft Insolvency Bill and Debt Relief Bill are 
enacted, this may offer alternative relief for LILA and NINA debtors. Pre-liquidation 
Compositions in terms of the Draft Insolvency Bill and Debt Intervention in terms of the Debt 
Relief Bill also provide a discharge of unpaid debts without having to undergo sequestration. 
However, the current rehabilitation provisions under the Insolvency Act will remain largely 
unchanged which means that debtors still have to wait long periods of time to obtain a 
discharge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
129 Van Heerden and Boraine (note 44 above) 53. 
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CHAPTER 3: DISCHARGE PRINCIPLES IN FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS  
3.1 Introduction  
The World Bank, in January 2011, convened its Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes Task 
Force (Task Force), to consider the insolvency of natural persons.130 The World Bank and Task 
Force created a working group of experts to investigate the issue and to consider worldwide 
trends.131 The Report reflects these investigations. This chapter will discuss the World Bank 
Report’s findings on international trends and guidelines relating to the discharge of debts. It 
will then examine the debt relief mechanisms in the USA, England and Wales, New Zealand, 
Ireland and Japan, and how these countries deal with the discharge of debts. 
3.2 The World Bank Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons 
According to the Report, discharge of debts is one of the most important characteristics of an 
insolvency regime for natural persons.132 One of the main aims of an insolvency system for 
natural persons is economic rehabilitation.133 This includes three elements. The first element 
is to free the debtor from excessive debt.134 The Report points out that ‘discharge is a very 
effective incentive for debtors to produce value to share with creditors.’135 According to the 
Report, the most effective form of debt relief is a ‘fresh start’.136 This refers to a straight 
discharge which enables debtors to be discharged from their debt obligations without 
undergoing a payment plan.137 The Report however recognises that many jurisdictions reject 
the notion of a straight discharge, opting rather for an ‘earned new start’ in terms of which 
the debtor is required to pay part of their debts in terms of a payment plan.138 These payment 
plans require partial payment or a debt rearrangement plan that regulates the debtors 
payments over a period of time, as a prerequisite for discharge.139  
                                                          
130 The World Bank Report (note 2 above) para 4. 
131 Ibid para 8. 
132 Ibid para 449. 
133 Ibid para 359. 
134 Ibid para 359. 
135 Ibid para 65. 
136 Ibid para 360. 
137 Ibid para 360. 
138 Ibid para 361. 
139 Ibid para 361. 
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The Report envisages a repayment plan that lasts between three and five years.140 According 
to Boraine and Roestoff, systems that have repayment plans spanning over long periods of 
time, repress the returns that a creditor can obtain and creates a disincentive for debtors.141 
Payment plans that last longer than three years have been shown to be unsuccessful.142 On 
the other hand, a limited payment term can also lead to a lack of motivation by the debtor 
which will delay his rehabilitation.143 According to the Report, a more attainable goal for a 
repayment plan would be to encourage responsible payment and to educate debtors.144 
Payment plans should also offer incentives to debtors, in the form of a discharge of unpaid 
debts.145 
The second element is the principle of non-discrimination, in terms of which, debtors who 
have obtained debt relief should not be discriminated against. 146 The third element is the 
financial education of debtors so that they learn how to use credit properly and they do not 
become ‘excessively indebted’ again.147 One way to discourage debtors from becoming 
indebted again, after obtaining relief, is by placing a prohibition on repeat filing for debt 
relief.148 Prior negotiations and debt counselling also have an educational value.149 Denying a 
discharge to debtors who abuse the system, or who incur debt in a fraudulent or unscrupulous 
manner, also ensures that only ‘unfortunate but honest debtors’ obtain relief.150 
The Report also points out that in order for a discharge to be more effective, the discharge 
should include as many debts as possible.151 Common exclusions include claims for 
maintenance, fines, taxes, student loans and post-commencement debts.152  
According to Boraine and Roestoff, ‘South Africa has noticeably fallen behind the rest of the 
world’153 with regard to their discharge principles. It is therefore vital to consider the 
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discharge trends applicable in foreign jurisdictions to consider which principles can be 
adopted into South African insolvency law. A discussion of the debt relief measures in other 
jurisdictions will now take place. 
3.3 Debt relief measures in foreign jurisdictions  
3.3.1 The United States of America 
3.3.1.1 Background 
One of the main aims of American bankruptcy law is the discharge of debts, which results in 
a fresh start.154 This aim is emphasised in the case of Local Loan Co v Hunt155 where the court 
stated that: ‘One of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to “relieve the honest 
debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from 
the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes…”’ 
American bankruptcy law seeks to advance two goals. Firstly, it seeks to provide the ‘honest 
but unfortunate debtor’ with a fresh start.156  According to Calitz ‘the underlying philosophy 
of this approach is that the debtor is a victim to unforeseen circumstances and should 
promptly be allowed back into society without the millstone of perpetual indebtedness.’157  
The second goal is to treat creditors fairly.158  The equal treatment of creditors ensures that 
creditors share the debtor’s financial value in an equitable manner.  This equal treatment 
discourages ‘overly aggressive collection efforts’ by creditors.159 The introduction of the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 2005 (BAPCPA) has however 
represented a shift away from a fresh start policy which favours debtors.160 
 
 
 
                                                          
154 RG Evans ‘A critical analysis of problem areas in respect of assets of insolvent estates of individuals’ LLD 
thesis University of Pretoria (2008) available at 
https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/24939/Complete.pdf?sequence=7 accessed on 
20/11/2017, 151. Roestoff and Coetzee (note 9 above) 71. 
155 292 US 234 (1934). 
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158 Ferriell and Janger (note 150 above) 1. 
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3.3.1.2 Bankruptcy  
The Bankruptcy Reform Act 1978 (Bankruptcy Code) offers two forms of debt relief to debtors, 
namely liquidation proceedings in terms of Chapter 7 and a debt-adjustment repayment plan 
in terms of Chapter 13. A reorganisation in terms of Chapter 11 is also available for insolvent 
individuals, but this procedure is expensive and complicated and, therefore, is generally 
utilised by businesses and not individual persons.161  
Chapter 7 liquidations seek to advance two goals, namely, to liquidate the debtor’s assets and 
to discharge unsecured debts.162 This procedure can be entered into either voluntarily, by the 
debtor, or involuntarily, by the creditor. This procedure entails the collection and realisation 
of the debtor’s assets by the trustee, who then distributes the realised assets to the 
creditors.163 Certain property is exempt from this procedure and this exempt property differs 
from state to state.164 Evans believes that the preservation of these, non-exempt, assets assist 
the debtor to obtain a ‘fresh start’.165 Debtors who successfully enter into and complete the 
Chapter 7 process receive an automatic discharge of most of their debts.166 There is however 
a limitation with regard to who qualifies for a discharge. The court will not grant a discharge 
to debtors who have previously been granted a Chapter 7 discharge eight years before the 
new filing.167 Debts that are exempt from being discharged include obligations to pay child 
support or alimony, certain tax obligations, student loans, debts obtained by fraud or theft, 
fines owed to government and debts owing for wilful and malicious injury.168 The discharge 
of debts relates only to the unsecured debts and not to the amount which the debtor pays to 
the creditor.169 
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code provides a procedure for the rescheduling of debts. This 
procedure can be entered into voluntarily by the debtor who must file a proposed repayment 
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plan,170 have a regular source of income171 and whose debts must not exceed $394, 725.172 
The debtors’ disposable income is used to fund the repayment plan for the total or partial 
satisfaction of the creditors’ claims.173 A debtor who enters into this procedure does not 
receive an automatic discharge and the debtor has to complete the required payments under 
the plan before they can receive a discharge.174 The period of the repayment plan is usually 
three years, but it may continue for a maximum of five years, with the courts approval.175 A 
debtor may, however, request a Chapter 13 ‘hardship discharge’ which the court may grant if 
it is satisfied that the failure of the debtor to complete the plan is due to circumstances for 
which the debtor should not justly be held accountable, the amount received by the creditors 
on their unsecured claims is not less than the liquidation value, and it is not practical to modify 
the payment plan.176 According to Coetzee, the purpose of the hardship procedure is to assist 
debtors who have entered into a repayment plan, and who have subsequently become NINA 
debtors.177 The debts that are not subject to discharge are similar to the non-dischargeable 
debts in terms of Chapter 7, save for debts arising from wilful and malicious injuries and debts 
owed to the government.178 
 
Unlike the Chapter 7 proceedings where the assets of the debtor are liquidated, debtors 
subject to a repayment plan may retain their valuable assets and pay the creditors out of their 
future income.179 Debt repayment plans, under Chapter 13, were designed to avoid the 
stigma attached to liquidation proceedings under Chapter 7 and it avoids the feeling of guilt 
by debtors who are able to offer some form of payment to their creditors.180 The Bankruptcy 
Code also contains a provision which specifically protects debtors under the Bankruptcy Code 
against discrimination. Section 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code prevents governmental units 
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from denying, revoking, suspending or refusing to renew a license, or similar grant, and from 
denying, terminating or discriminating with regard to employment of the debtor or bankrupt, 
while Section 525(b) prevents private employers from terminating or discriminating with 
regard to employment of the debtor or bankrupt. 
The BAPCPA, which amended the Bankruptcy Code, introduced a ‘means test’, which 
determines for which debt relief procedure a debtor will qualify.181 Prior to the introduction 
of the BAPCPA, debtors were able to unconditionally discharge certain debts without having 
to pay off at least a portion of the debt through a repayment plan.182 The BAPCPA represents 
a shift away from the ‘fresh start’ policy183 and debtors are now required to undergo a ‘means 
test’ to determine whether they are able to pay a portion of their debt from future income.184 
Where the means test is applied and it is found that the debtor has sufficient disposable 
income, the debtor is precluded from using the Chapter 7 process.185 This means test was 
introduced as a solution to combat abuse of the procedure.186 
The BAPCPA also introduced mandatory credit counselling and debtor education as a 
prerequisite for entering into bankruptcy proceedings.187 This includes a briefing from an 
approved non-profit budget and credit counselling agency that assists the consumer in 
performing a budget analysis and educates them about available credit counselling.188  This 
process encourages out-of-court negotiations between the debtor and creditor, without 
having to pursue the formal Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 procedure.189  Debtors are also required 
to complete an ‘instructional course concerning personal financial management’ pursuant to 
a discharge in terms of Chapter 7 or Chapter 13.190  
The introduction of the BAPCPA has been widely criticised. According to Kilborn, the 
introduction of the means test has burdened debtors with loads of paperwork and has 
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burdened administrators who have to monitor compliance.191 Calitz criticises the mandatory 
credit counselling and debtor education as an added expense that is difficult to implement.192 
3.3.1.3 Alternatives  
An alternative to debt relief under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code is 
voluntary settlement or a ‘debt management plan’.193 These plans are however costly and 
often fail to offer relief to debtors.194 They also do not provide reprieve to the debtor through 
the discharge of unpaid debts. 
3.3.2 England and Wales 
3.3.2.1 Background 
Personal insolvency law in England and Wales consists of both statutory and non-statutory 
procedures.195 The statutory procedures available include bankruptcy, Debt Relief Orders, 
Individual Voluntary Arrangements, County Court Administration Orders and Debt 
Management Arrangements. These measures are regulated by the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA), 
the Enterprise Act 2002 (EA) and the Insolvency Rules 1986 (IR), with 2010 amendments.196 
The common law Debt Management Plan is also available to debtors seeking debt relief.197 
3.3.2.2 Bankruptcy  
According to Walters, bankruptcy, in terms of the IA, ‘amounts to a statutory bargain that 
seeks to balance the interests of debtors and creditors.’198 A petition for bankruptcy may be 
brought by a creditor or by the debtor him or herself,199 and there are no strict entry 
requirements.200 Upon entering into the procedure, all non-exempt property is surrendered 
by the debtor and the debtor may keep exempt property including tools of trade and any items 
                                                          
191 JJ Kilborn ‘Still Chasing Chimeras but Finally Slaying Some Dragons in the Quest for Consumer Bankruptcy 
Reform’ Consumer Law Review (2012) 6. 
192 Calitz (note 50 above) 408. 
193 INSOL International Consumer Debt Report II: Report of findings and recommendations (2011) 312. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Ibid 112. 
196 Ibid 112. 
197 Ibid 112. 
198 A Walters ‘Individual Voluntary Arrangements: A “Fresh Start” for Salaried Consumer Debtors in England 
and Wales?’ International Insolvency Review (2009) 5, 14. 
199 IA S 264. 
200 IA S 265. 
 27 
 
necessary for their domestic needs.201 The IA also offers some protection to debtors, and to 
their families, with regard to their home.202 The debtor is automatically discharged after one 
year,203 but he may be discharged sooner upon notice by the Official Receiver that an 
investigation into the affairs and conduct of the debtor is unnecessary or have been 
concluded.204 McKenzie Skene and Walters note that the reason for the reduction of the 
discharge period was to ‘encourage honest but failed entrepreneurs to re-engage in risk-taking 
by providing a quick, comprehensive discharge and by reducing the stigma attaching to 
bankruptcy…’.205 Coetzee however notes that this shorter discharge period does not serve an 
educational purpose as it will not encourage the responsible use of credit amongst consumers 
and may even lead to possible abuses of the procedure.206 The discharge period may be 
suspended by the court if the court is satisfied that the debtor has failed or is failing to comply 
with his obligations.207 This is in line with the Report which encourages ‘good behaviour’ as a 
prerequisite to the discharge of debts.208 The discharge does not release the debtor from 
debts owing to secured creditors, debts incurred in respect of fraud or fraudulent breach of 
trust, fines imposed for an offence, liability for damages, debts that arose in terms of the Child 
Support Act 1991 or any debts that were not provable in bankruptcy.209 
3.3.2.3 Alternatives 
England and Wales offers the possibility of a Debt Relief Order to NINA debtors, whose total 
liabilities do not exceed £15 000, whose surplus income does not exceed £50 and whose 
assets do not exceed £300.210 The debtor must not have previously been admitted to the 
proceedings for six years prior to the application.211 This procedure is less costly than 
bankruptcy as there is no court involvement.212 A Debt Relief Order places a moratorium on 
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the qualifying debts of the debtor for a period of one year213 after which the debtor is 
discharged from all qualifying debts.214 The debtor is not discharged for any debts arising as a 
result of fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the debtor was party.215 
Individual Voluntary Arrangements allow debtors to avoid bankruptcy by making a proposal 
to their creditors in order to reach a binding agreement with regard to the payment of their 
debts.216 In order to be binding the proposal has to be accepted by 75 percent of the 
creditors.217 This procedure offers some sort of debt relief to debtors who can agree on a 
discharge with their creditors.218 Whist legislation does not specify the duration of the period 
for which the procedure must run, in practice it generally runs for at least five years.219 This 
process is a good alternative to bankruptcy as it avoids the ‘greater publicity and perceived 
stigma associated with bankruptcy.’220 
The County Court Administration Order is available to debtors whose total debts do not 
exceed £5000.221 McKenzie Skene and Walters describes this process as a ‘court-based debt 
management solution designed to provide relatively small debtors who have some income 
but limited assets with respite from enforcement coupled with rescheduled and consolidation 
of their debts.’222 This process offers some sort of debt relief to debtors where the parties 
agree that the debtor will only be required to pay a portion of the debt and the balance of 
their debts will be discharged.223 
Debt Management Arrangements are also available for debtors ‘who have a regular source of 
surplus income.’224 However, this process offers very little relief to debtors and it may run for 
a long period of time.225 
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3.3.3 New Zealand  
3.3.3.1 Background 
New Zealand’s personal insolvency regime is regulated by the Insolvency Act 2006226 (IANZ). 
This Act provides for a bankruptcy process227 and alternative debt relief measures, namely, 
the No-Asset Procedure, proposals and Summary Instalment Orders.228 Of these four 
procedures, only the bankruptcy process and the No-Asset Procedure allow for the automatic 
discharge of debts.  
3.3.3.2 Bankruptcy  
A creditor may apply to the court229 and a debtor may apply to the Assignee to enter into 
bankruptcy proceedings.230 In order to enter into the proceedings, the debtor has to have 
combined debts of $1000.231 All provable debts232 that a bankrupt owes at the time of 
adjudication or after adjudication but before discharge,233 are included in the procedure and 
are automatically discharged after three years,234 save for certain exceptions.235 Alternatively, 
the bankrupt may at any time apply to the court for an order to be discharged, unless an 
application for discharge has previously been refused, in which case the bankrupt may only 
apply again after a specified date.236 The Assignee must summon the bankrupt concerning his 
or her discharge and the court must conduct a public examination in certain circumstances.237 
The court may grant or refuse the discharge, having regard to all the circumstances of the 
case.238 The bankrupt is not released from any debt incurred by fraud,239 debt for which the 
bankrupt has obtained forbearance through fraud to which the bankrupt was a party,240 any 
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judgment debt,241 any amount payable under a maintenance order242 or any amount payable 
under the Child Support Act 1991.243 The Assignee or a creditor may apply to have an absolute 
discharge reversed two years after the discharge244 or two years after the discharge takes 
effect, in the case of a conditional or suspended discharge.245 The court may reverse the 
discharge if it is satisfied that new facts have arisen since the order of discharge was made246 
and that, had the court known of the new facts, the court would have been justified in refusing 
the discharge.247 
3.3.3.3 Alternatives 
An alternative to bankruptcy is the No-Asset Procedure which offers debt relief to debtors 
who have no realisable assets.248 This procedure has strict entry requirements and a debtor 
must show that he or she has no realisable assets249 and that his or her total debts (excluding 
student loans) are between NZ$1000 and NZ$47 000.250 The debtor must also not have 
previously been admitted into the No-Asset Procedure251 or been adjudicated bankrupt252 
and the debtor must not have the means to repay the debt.253 Maintenance orders, amounts 
payable under the Child Support Act 1991 and student loans are excluded from this 
procedure.254  The debtor’s participation in the No-Asset Procedure is terminated by the 
Assignee when the debtor applies for adjudication or when a creditor applies for the debtor’s 
adjudication as a bankrupt.255 If the procedure is not terminated in one of these ways then 
the debtor is automatically discharged 12 months after being admitted to the No-Asset 
Procedure.256 The Assignee may however extend this 12 month period.257 Telfer notes that 
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due to the No-Asset Procedure having a shorter discharge period than the bankruptcy 
proceeding, this may lead to an abuse of the No-Asset Procedure.258 Upon discharge, the 
debtor’s debts are cancelled, including any penalties and interest that may have accrued.259 
Debts incurred by fraud, or debts for which the debtor has obtained forbearance through 
fraud, to which the debtor was a party are however excluded from discharge.260 Keeper notes 
that the No-Asset Procedure does not have debt education as a prerequisite of discharge.261 
This is not in line with the Report and may be detrimental to debtors in the future.  
An insolvent person may, as an alternative to bankruptcy proceedings, make a proposal to 
creditors for the payment or satisfaction of the insolvent’s debts.262 The proposal has to be 
accepted by three-quarters in value and the majority in numbers of creditors in order to be 
binding.263 Alternatively, the debtor or creditor, with the debtor’s consent,264 may apply to 
the Assignee for a Summary Instalment Order whereby the debtor will pay his debts in 
instalments, or otherwise.265 This procedure may only be used if the debtors total unsecured 
debts (excluding student loans) do not exceed NZ$47 000.266  A Summary Instalment Order 
takes place over a period of three years, but may be extended to five years under special 
circumstances.267 This is in line with the payment period envisaged in the World Bank 
Report.268 Both the proposal and summary instalment order procedures do not provide for 
the discharge of unpaid debts. 
3.3.4 Ireland  
3.3.4.1 Background  
Ireland’s personal insolvency regime has recently undergone a complete overhaul with the 
introduction of the Personal Insolvency Act 2012 (PIA) which became effective in 2013. This 
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change has brought Ireland’s personal insolvency regime in line with the main themes of the 
World Bank Report.269 Irish bankruptcy law envisions an earned fresh start that requires 
debtors to make some sort of payment over a period of time.270 The Irish law also gives the 
court discretion to decide the amount of the payment that the debtor has to make.271 One 
significant change that has been brought about as a result of the PIA is the change from the 
twelve-year discharge period in the bankruptcy proceedings, to a three-year discharge period. 
According to the Law Reform Commission of Ireland, the discharge period of twelve years, 
which was previously in place in Ireland, is ‘excessively long and contrasts sharply with the 
fresh start principle which characterises modern insolvency codes’.272 Kilborn notes that the 
discharge requirements that are now in place in Ireland are innovative and introduce 
‘effective relief where none had existed before’.273 The PIA provides four statutory debt relief 
mechanisms, namely, bankruptcy, Debt Relief Notices, the Debt Settlement Arrangement and 
the Personal Insolvency Arrangement.   
3.3.4.2 Bankruptcy  
Bankruptcy proceedings may be entered into against the debtor, whose debts exceed 
€20 000,274 upon petition to the court by the creditor275 or the debtor himself.276 Irish 
bankruptcy law favours out-of-court negotiations between debtors and creditors,277 and as a 
result, debtors have to earn their discharge when petitioning for an order of bankruptcy. In 
order to enter into bankruptcy proceedings, the debtor has to state in a sworn affidavit that 
he has ‘made reasonable efforts to reach an appropriate arrangement with his creditors.’278 
Kilborn notes that the World Bank Report tries to encourage out-of-court negotiated 
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workouts in order to avoid the costs involved with formal intervention.279 I submit that this 
pre-requisite to enter into bankruptcy proceedings would show a genuine effort on the part 
of the debtor and would assist in preventing abuse of the process.  This would also assist 
courts as they will not have to hear unnecessary applications where the debtor has not 
attempted to negotiate with their creditors. 
The debtor is automatically discharged on the third anniversary of the adjudication order and 
this discharge is not subject to the courts discretion.280 The unrealised property of the debtor 
remains vested in the Official Assignee for the benefit of the creditors.281 Kilborn describes 
the change from a twelve-year discretionary discharge period to a three-year non-
discretionary discharge period as being a real innovation that offers effective relief.282 The 
debtor is entitled to an order of discharge sooner than after a period of three years where he 
has paid the full amount of the debt, including interest, as the court may allow, or he has 
obtained the written consent of all his creditors.283  Another way in which Irish law has tried 
to encourage out-of-court negotiations is by allowing the debtor to make an application to 
court, to grant a stay on the realisation of his estate, to enable him to make an offer of 
composition to his creditors.284 Upon payment of the amount agreed upon in the 
composition, the debtor may apply to court to be discharged.285 
3.3.4.3 Alternatives  
The Debt Relief Notice procedure is available to low income debtors whose debts do not 
exceed €20 000.286 The debtor’s net disposable income may not exceed €60 a month287 and 
their assets may not exceed €400.288 The Debt Relief Notice procedure is administrative in 
nature and places a moratorium on any legal proceedings, enforcement procedures or any 
steps taken to recover the qualifying debt.289 The Debt Relief Notice remains in effect for a 
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period of three years,290 but this period may be extended upon application by the Insolvency 
Service.291 After the three-year period the debtor is discharged of all qualifying debts, 
including interest, penalties and other sums which have become payable in relation to those 
debts.292 The debtor’s name is also removed from the Register of Debt Relief Notices, the 
creditors are notified of the discharge and a Debt Relief Certificate is issued to the debtor.293 
The debtor may be discharged of all their qualifying debts sooner where they pay an amount 
of not less than 50 per cent of their qualifying debts.294  
The Debt Settlement Arrangement and Personal Insolvency Arrangement are also available 
for insolvent debtors in Ireland. The Debt Settlement Arrangement does not have strict entry 
requirements295 and it allows the debtor to make a proposal to one or more of his creditors 
in respect of the payment of his debts.296 The Personal Insolvency Arrangement allows a 
debtor, whose debts do not exceed €30 000,297 to make a proposal to one of more of his 
creditors in respect of the payment of his debts.298 Both these procedures require the 
majority of creditors, representing more than 65 percent in value of the total debts of the 
debtor, to accept the proposal in order for it to be binding.299  
3.3.5 Japan  
3.3.5.1 Background  
Personal insolvency law in Japan consists of two types of proceedings, namely, liquidation in 
terms of the Bankruptcy Act300 and rehabilitation in terms of the Civil Rehabilitation Act.301  
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3.3.5.2 Bankruptcy  
An application for liquidation under the Bankruptcy Act is deemed to be a filing for 
discharge.302 In terms of this procedure, the debtor pledges their non-exempt assets which 
will be sold in execution and distributed to the creditors.303 Exempt assets include the debtor’s 
household furniture, goods and appliances, cash of up to ¥990 000 and unpaid salary of up to 
¥330 000 per month.304 After the proceeds have been distributed, the debtor is able to apply 
for a discharge, regardless of whether the entire debt has been paid off.305 The discharge is 
however discretionary and the debtor is not automatically discharged.306 Furthermore, the 
debtor may not be discharged if he was previously discharged within seven years of the new 
filing.307 The discharge excludes debts arising from taxes, compensation for damages as a 
result of wilful tort, wages, penalties and fines, personal injury or death caused by an 
intentional or reckless act of the debtor and debts for alimony, maintenance or support of 
the debtor’s spouse or child.308 A debtor will only be granted a discharge if they have assets 
in their estate.309 This means that there must be some form of advantage to creditors 
otherwise the procedure will be terminated.310 Regardless of whether these conditions are 
met, the court has the right to grant a discharge if there is financial failure by the debtor.311 
3.3.5.3 Alternatives  
An alternative to liquidation is the special civil rehabilitation procedure which is available for 
debtors whose debts do not exceed ¥50 million.312  In terms of this procedure, the debtor and 
creditor agree on a repayment plan in terms of which the debtor will pay a portion of their 
future income monthly to their creditors.313 The repayment plan is over a period of three 
years, but may be extended to up to five years.314 This procedure does not offer the debtor a 
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discharge of unpaid debts and the debtor has to comply with the repayment plan before 
obtaining a discharge. 
3.4 Conclusion  
According to the World Bank Report, the three most important aspects of the rehabilitation 
include discharge, non-discrimination and debtor education. After considering the insolvency 
laws in USA, England and Wales, New Zealand, Ireland and Japan, it is apparent that the 
principles relating to the discharge of debts in most of these jurisdictions are in line with the 
Report. While some of these debt relief measures are flawed and may not be quite so straight 
forward in practice, South Africa is still able to learn from the worldwide trend of inclusivity 
and offering debtors a fresh start. It is important now to compare the debt relief measures 
applicable in these jurisdictions with the mechanisms in place in South Africa, in order to 
determine which principles, relating to the discharge of debts, South Africa can adopt into its 
insolvency regime.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS  
4.1 Introduction  
According to Roestoff, ‘South Africa has fallen behind the rest of the world and reform of the 
system’s income restructuring measures, to bring them in line with modern trends, is vital.’315 
It is therefore useful to obtain insights by drawing comparisons between South Africa and 
USA, England and Wales, New Zealand, Ireland and Japan. This chapter will draw comparisons 
in order to determine which aspects can be adopted into South Africa’s insolvency law, in 
order to bring it in line with the World Bank Report.  
4.2 Comparative analysis 
South Africa’s debt relief mechanisms are substantially different from USA’s bankruptcy laws. 
Firstly, it must be noted that the main aim of South Africa’s Insolvency Act is for the 
sequestration to bring about an ‘advantage of creditors.’316 This is in contrast to USA’s debtor 
friendly system where the main aim of bankruptcy law is to provide relief to the ‘honest but 
unfortunate debtor’.317 The BAPCPA has, however, represented a shift away from this 
approach and debtors no longer have a choice between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
proceedings.318 Chapter 7 liquidations are similar to sequestration under the Insolvency Act 
in that both processes provide for the liquidation of the debtor’s assets and for a discharge of 
debts.319 However, unlike South Africa, where the debtor must have sufficient assets to pay 
the creditor a ‘not negligible dividend’,320 the Chapter 7 liquidation proceedings are available 
to debtors who do not have sufficient disposable income.321 This means that debtors with 
little or no income have access to Chapter 7 liquidations. Discharge in terms of Chapter 7 
liquidations are also immediate and the debtor does not have to wait unnecessarily long 
periods to obtain a discharge.322 In South Africa, the debtor has to wait ten years before 
receiving an automatic discharge.323 With regard to repeat filing, a South African debtor, who 
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has previously been rehabilitated, has to wait a period of three years to be able to apply for 
rehabilitation again.324 This is in contrast to Chapter 7 liquidations under the Bankruptcy 
Code, where debtors who have previously been granted a discharge have to wait eight years 
before being able to reapply for a discharge.325  In the USA, the list of property, which is 
excluded from being discharged, is a lot more extensive than that in South Africa.326 In the 
USA, while student loans are excluded from being discharged, a forgiveness scheme has been 
introduced to assist debtors with their student debt obligations.327 
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code is similar to debt review in terms of the NCA and 
administration orders offered by section 74 of the MCA.328 The NCA places a restriction on 
the type of debts329 and section 74 of the MCA limits the amount of debts required to qualify 
for the payment plan.330 Similarly, Chapter 13 bankruptcy restricts the amount of debt 
required to qualify for the payment plan.331 Repayment plans in both jurisdictions are not 
available to NINA debtors who do not have sufficient income to make payments in terms of a 
payment plan. Unlike the NCA and MCA, Chapter 13 places a restriction on the period of the 
payment plan. Payment plans in terms of Chapter 13 span three to five years, which is in line 
with the Report.332 Another distinction is that Chapter 13 offers debtors a discharge in the 
form of a ‘hardship discharge’ for debtors who are unable to fulfil their commitments in terms 
of the payment plan.333 Repayment plans in South Africa offer no discharge of unpaid debts 
to debtors and they span over long periods of time.334 
The BAPCPA in the USA requires debtors to undergo mandatory credit counselling and debtor 
education in order to enter into bankruptcy proceedings.335 In South Africa, there is no 
specific requirement in the Insolvency Act for debtor education. The NCA is the only 
mechanism which requires debtors to see a debt counsellor before entering into a payment 
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plan.336 The Debt Intervention procedure that has been proposed in the Debt Relief Bill makes 
provision for the establishment of a financial literacy and budgeting skills programme, but it 
is not yet certain how this programme will operate.337 The debtor education requirement, in 
terms of the BAPCPA, is costly and time-consuming and it is uncertain whether South Africa 
will benefit from a provision similar to this.338  
Bankruptcy proceedings in England and Wales are also similar to sequestration in South 
Africa, where the assets of the debtor are liquidated and the debtor is discharged after a 
certain period of time.339 However, unlike sequestration in South Africa, bankruptcy 
proceedings do not have the stringent ‘advantage of creditors’ requirement.340 The discharge 
period of one year under bankruptcy proceedings is also significantly less than that in South 
Africa.341 Discharge, in terms of the bankruptcy process, is dependent upon the good 
behaviour of the debtor during bankruptcy proceedings, which is an attractive reason to offer 
a shorter discharge period, however the one year period could lead to an abuse of the 
bankruptcy procedure.342 The list of debts that are exempt from being discharged under 
bankruptcy proceedings are wider than the exempt debts under sequestration.343 
There are many different alternative debt relief mechanisms in place in England and Wales 
that cater for different classes of debtors. England and Wales offer NINA debtors relief in the 
form of a Debt Relief Order.344 Debt Relief orders provide NINA debtors with a discharge of 
debts after one year.345  In South Africa there is no mechanism that offers specific relief to 
this class of debtors. If the proposed Debt Relief Bill is enacted this will be the only statutory 
debt relief mechanism in South Africa that caters specifically for NINA debtors.346 The 
Individual Voluntary Arrangement procedure in England and Wales can be compared to the 
proposed pre-liquidation composition in South Africa and both these procedures rely on 
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acceptance by the majority of creditors.347 Unlike the proposed pre-liquidation composition, 
Individual Voluntary Arrangements do not have a limit on the amount of debts required to 
enter into the procedure.348 County Court Administration Orders and Debt Management 
Arrangements are similar to the repayment plans available in South Africa, and offer very little 
relief to debtors.349 
Bankruptcy proceedings in New Zealand are also similar to the sequestration proceedings 
under South Africa’s Insolvency Act in that both procedures provide for the liquidation of the 
debtor’s assets and for the discharge of debts.350 The entry requirements however differ.351 
With regard to New Zealand’s bankruptcy proceedings, there is a monetary cap on the 
amount of debts that the debtor must have in order to enter into the proceedings,352 while 
for sequestration in South Africa, there is an ‘advantage of creditors’ requirement.353 The 
discharge period applicable in New Zealand’s bankruptcy process is three years,354 as opposed 
to South Africa’s ten-year discharge period.355 New Zealand, unlike South Africa, also offers a 
procedure for NINA and LILA debtors in the form of the No-Asset Procedure.356 The No-Asset 
Procedure has a limitation on the total debts that the debtor must have and repeat filing of 
the procedure is not allowed.357 The debts are discharged after one year, which may be seen 
as being too short a period.358 Summary Instalment Orders, in place in New Zealand, are 
similar to South Africa’s debt review process and administration orders, which equates to a 
repayment plan with no forced discharge.359 These mechanisms do not offer relief to debtors 
earning little or no income. One difference is that the Summary Instalment Order specifies a 
period for the payment plan,360 unlike debt review and administration orders where the 
repayment plan continues for an indefinite period.361 Proposals, provided for in New 
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Zealand’s insolvency law, are similar to the proposed pre-liquidation composition in South 
Africa.362 Coetzee notes that the pre-liquidation composition, which has been proposed in 
South Africa, can draw from the proposal procedure in New Zealand.363 Firstly, he states that 
the title used in New Zealand does not create the impression that the composition is a pre-
liquidation requirement.364 Secondly, there is no monetary threshold to enter into 
proposals.365 
Ireland’s bankruptcy proceedings are similar to sequestration in terms of the Insolvency Act 
and both entail the liquidation of the debtor’s assets followed by the discharge of debts.366 
However, instead of the ‘advantage of creditors’ requirement, entry into the bankruptcy 
proceedings require the debtors’ debts to exceed €20 000.367 This excludes many people from 
using this mechanism. Ireland’s bankruptcy proceedings also require debtors to attempt to 
negotiate with their creditors as a pre-requisite to enter into the proceedings.368 In South 
Africa, out-of-court negotiations are not a pre-requisite to enter into the sequestration 
process.369 The discharge period has also been reduced in Ireland, from twelve years to three 
years.370 This is in contrast to South Africa’s ten-year discharge period.371 
Ireland offers relief to LILA debtors, in the form of a Debt Relief Notice.372 The Debt Relief 
Notice offers a discharge of unpaid debts after three years.373 In South Africa, LILA debtors 
are often unable to access the available statutory debt relief mechanisms and there are no 
procedures that specifically offer relief to this class of debtors. If enacted, the proposed Debt 
Relief Bill will offer debt relief to LILA debtors in South Africa.374 Ireland also offers Debt 
Settlement Arrangements and Personal Insolvency Arrangements, which are similar to the 
proposed pre-liquidation composition in South Africa.375  
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Liquidation in terms of Japan’s Bankruptcy Act is similar to sequestration proceedings in terms 
of South Africa’s Insolvency Act.376 Both these mechanisms offer debt relief in the form of 
liquidation of the debtors’ estate and a discharge of debts. Both procedures also have strict 
entry requirements.377 However, even though Japan has strict entry requirements, the debtor 
does not have to wait unnecessarily long periods before obtaining a discharge.378 The 
discharge under Japan’s Bankruptcy Act takes place almost immediately, at the court’s 
discretion.379 The Bankruptcy Act also has an educational purpose for debtors who have to 
wait seven years before filing for a new discharge.380 This is in contrast to South Africa where 
the debtor only has to wait three years before reapplying for a discharge.381 This longer 
waiting period could serve an educational purpose, which is in line with the World Bank 
Report.382 
Special Civil Rehabilitation, offered in Japan, is similar to the debt review process in terms of 
the NCA.383 However, Special Civil Rehabilitation restricts the repayment plan to a period of 
three to five years, unlike the NCA where the repayment plan could continue indefinitely.384 
Both mechanisms do not provide debtors with any forced discharge. 
4.3 Conclusion  
In stark contrast to South Africa, many foreign jurisdictions are debtor friendly and give 
debtors the opportunity to obtain a straight discharge, without having to prove stringent 
entry requirements. Furthermore, many of the jurisdictions offer specific debt relief measures 
that cater for LILA and NINA debtors. The discharge periods applicable in these jurisdictions 
are also significantly less than the discharge period offered in South Africa, which is more in 
line with the World Bank Report’s recommendations. The repayment plans also have 
maximum time periods, which could be beneficial in South Africa where the debtor is unable 
to obtain a discharge and is stuck in the repayment plan for years. In the next chapter, the 
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threads will be tied together and recommendations will be given as to which debt relief 
measures will be best suited for adoption in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION  
‘Providing a fresh start to a debtor who cannot reasonable repay all of his pre-existing 
debts is the recognition by society that over-indebtedness is, in many cases excusable. 
It is the key-element of any consumer debtor insolvency law or rehabilitation 
procedure, based on the principle that it is in society’s interest that the debtor should 
be able to begin afresh, free from past financial obligations and not suffer indefinitely. 
It is the distinction between punishment of yesteryear and the economic reality of the 
twenty-first century.’385 
5.1 Conclusion   
The objective of this dissertation was to assess the current debt relief mechanisms available 
to South African debtors and to examine whether the discharge principles applicable are in 
line with appropriate discharge principles as envisaged by the World Bank Report and with 
international trends and guidelines. It was seen from the outset that economic rehabilitation 
is one of the principle purposes of any insolvency regime.386 Kilborn points out that one of the 
overarching themes of the Report is for debtors to obtain debt relief through a forced 
discharge of a portion, or all, of their debts.387 This is in keeping with the ‘fresh start’ principle. 
It has been mentioned in Chapter one that South Africa’s Insolvency Act offers over-indebted 
consumers a ‘fresh start’ in the form of a forced discharge, without having to undergo a 
repayment plan.388 Rehabilitation, through sequestration, is however the only statutory 
mechanism, in South Africa, which a debtor can use to secure the discharge of unpaid 
debts.389 Furthermore, the debtor, upon entering into the sequestration proceedings, has to 
wait ten years before obtaining an automatic discharge.390 The discharge is, however, subject 
to the discretion of the court and there is no guarantee that the debtor will obtain a 
discharge.391 The debtor may apply to be discharged earlier if he fulfils certain 
requirements.392 The Insolvency Act is creditor friendly and in order to enter into the 
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sequestration proceedings, the debtor has to prove the stringent ‘advantage of creditors’ 
requirement in terms of which liquidation of the debtor’s assets must yield a not-negligible 
dividend.393 This creates a barrier for many debtors wishing to use the mechanism.  
South African insolvency law also provides for debt review in terms of the NCA394 and 
administration orders in terms of the MCA.395 However, these statutory mechanisms do not 
provide the debtor with any discharge of unpaid debts, and the debtor has to make payments 
in terms of a repayment plan before he can obtain a discharge. It has been established that 
debt review in terms of the NCA, requires the debtor to satisfy his debt obligations in full.396 
An administration order in terms of the MCA also requires the debtor to pay all his debts 
before obtaining a discharge.397 Furthermore, these repayment plans do not provide for a 
maximum time period within which the payment must be made and the debtor may be locked 
in the repayment plan indefinitely.398 The World Bank Report envisages a repayment plan that 
lasts between three and five years and considers any repayment plan that exceeds five years 
as being irresponsible.399 There are also a number of limitations with regard to South Africa’s 
payment plans. Administration orders, for example, have a monetary cap of R50 000, while 
debt review is only available to debtors whose debts arose as a result of a credit agreement.400 
Another challenge which South African debtors face is that there is no debt relief measure 
that caters for NINA or LILA debtors. Debtors with little or no income are unable to access the 
sequestration process as they are unable to satisfy the ‘advantage of creditors’ 
requirement.401 NINA debtors are also unable to use debt review or administration orders as 
a form of debt relief as both these mechanisms require the debtor to have a monthly 
income.402 The only mechanism that is currently in place, which can assist NINA debtors, is 
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the common law compromise, however, creditors are often hesitant to enter into a 
compromise with debtors.403 
If the proposed Draft Insolvency Bill is enacted, the proposed pre-liquidation composition will 
provide LILA and NINA debtors with an alternative procedure to sequestration and will enable 
them to obtain a discharge of debts, and thus a fresh start.404 Roestoff however notes that 
the pre-liquidation compositions will do little to provide NINA debtors with appropriate relief, 
as these debtors have no assets or income to offer their creditors.405 Coetzee states that while 
the pre-liquidation composition is meant to cater for lower income groups, it is not suitable 
for NINA debtors, who do not have anything valuable to offer to their creditors and thus will 
not have any bargaining power.406 This procedure does however provide debtors with an 
alternative mechanism to apply for a discharge of debts where the composition is not 
accepted by the majority of the creditors.407  The proposed Draft Insolvency Bill has retained 
the ‘advantage of creditors’ requirement and the discharge period of ten years remains 
unchanged.408 
The Debt Intervention procedure, proposed in the Debt Relief Bill, may however be a step in 
the right direction.409 It is submitted that, if enacted, this new procedure would offer relief, 
in the form of a full or partial discharge, to a class of debtors that are currently excluded from 
formal debt relief intervention. There are no strict entry requirements for this proposed 
procedure, however, there is a monetary cap of R50 000.410 This means that not all LILA and 
NINA debtors would have access to this procedure. Despite this limitation, the proposed 
procedure is commendable and would bring South Africa’s insolvency regime in line with 
international trends. 
South African law governing debt relief measures needs to be reassessed.  Calitz submits that 
South Africa has ignored international trends in consumer insolvency law.411 In Chapter Three, 
the insolvency laws of the USA, England and Wales, New Zealand, Ireland and Japan were 
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examined. In comparing these jurisdictions to South Africa, it became clear that most of these 
jurisdictions were more debtor friendly and were more in line with the World Bank Report’s 
recommendations.  
In the USA, the insolvency law is underpinned by the fresh start principle, where ‘honest but 
unfortunate debtors’ are able to obtain a discharge almost immediately, upon entering into 
the Chapter 7 liquidation proceedings.412 Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code also offers debt 
relief to debtors with a steady source of income and offers a discharge to debtors, in the form 
of a ‘hardship discharge’, to debtors who enter into the procedure but subsequently become 
NINA debtors.413 The introduction of the BAPCPA introduced a shift away from the fresh start 
principle and now requires the debtor to undergo a means test to determine whether they 
qualify to enter into Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 proceedings.414  
In England and Wales, there are various procedures in place which cater for different classes 
of debtors. The entrance requirements for debtors wishing to apply for bankruptcy are 
straight forward and the debtor is discharged after just one year.415 However, the court has 
the power to suspend the discharge period if the debtor fails to comply with his obligations.416  
The Debt Relief Order is available to NINA debtors and the debtor is automatically discharged 
after one year.417  Individual Voluntary Arrangements is a good alternative to bankruptcy and 
offers a mechanism to debtors who do not wish to be associated with the stigma attached to 
bankruptcy.418 This procedure allows debtors to reach an agreement with their creditors, 
regarding their debt. County Court Administration Orders and Debt Management 
Arrangements are also available to debtors wishing to rearrange their debts.419  
Bankruptcy proceedings in New Zealand, regulated by the Insolvency Act 2006, offer debtors 
debt relief in the form of a discharge which takes place automatically after three years.420 
New Zealand also offers relief to NINA debtors in the form of the No-Asset Procedure.421 This 
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procedure has strict entry requirements, in order to prevent abuses and the debtor is 
automatically rehabilitated one year after entering into the No-Asset Procedure.422 Summary 
Instalment Orders allow the debtor to pay his debts in instalments and operate for a period 
of three to five years.423  
Irish insolvency law, which recently underwent a complete overhaul, is now in line with the 
main themes of the Report.424 The discharge principles in place are modern and assist the 
debtor in their economic rehabilitation. As a pre-requisite to enter into bankruptcy 
proceedings, the debtor has to make a genuine effort to reach an arrangement with his 
creditors.425 The debtor qualifies for an automatic discharge, three years after being declared 
bankrupt, and the discharge is not subject to the courts discretion.426 The Debt Relief Notice 
procedure provides relief to LILA debtors and discharges the debtor after a three-year 
period.427 Debt Settlement Arrangements and Personal Insolvency Arrangements allow the 
debtor to pay his debts in monthly instalments, however, both these mechanisms do not 
provide an automatic discharge of debts.428 
Bankruptcy, under Japan’s Bankruptcy Act, has strict entry requirements, but allows the 
debtor to apply for a discharge almost immediately.429 The discharge is subject to the court’s 
discretion and there is a waiting period of seven years if the debtor was previously discharged 
and wishes to be discharged again. Special civil rehabilitation allows the debtor to agree on a 
repayment plan with his debtor.430 This procedure lasts for three to five years and does not 
offer any discharge of unpaid debts to the debtor.431 
5.2 Recommendations  
In order to bring South Africa’s debt relief mechanisms in line with recommended discharge 
principles, as envisaged by the World Bank Report, and with international trends, South 
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African insolvency law needs a complete overhaul.432 The following recommendations are 
submitted as a way for debtors to obtain a fresh start and to undergo economic rehabilitation, 
as envisaged by the World Bank Report.  
The first barrier which South African insolvency law faces is the creditor-orientated approach 
which prevents debtors from accessing the sequestration process, and thus obtaining a 
discharge.433 This creditor-orientated approach is in contrast to the approach used in the USA, 
where the primary purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to offer relief to the ‘honest but 
unfortunate debtor.’434 Roestoff and Coetzee suggest that South African courts should do 
away with the creditor-orientated approach, in favour of an assets-based procedure which 
requires the court to consider the interests of the debtor when exercising its discretion.435 
This is similar to the approach used in England and Wales.436 This balanced approach will still 
give the court the power to use their discretion to prevent people, wishing to abuse the 
process, from entering into the proceedings. In this way, more honest debtors will be able to 
undergo sequestration and qualify for a discharge of unpaid debts. It is further submitted, 
that South Africa should adopt the stance used in Ireland, with regard to out-of-court 
negotiations.437 South African debtors should be required to take reasonable steps to 
negotiate with their creditors, before applying for sequestration. This would lessen the courts 
workload, avoid costs of formal intervention and will ensure that the debtor has considered 
all alternatives before applying for sequestration. Out-of-court negotiations will also be 
appropriate for LILA debtors, who are often excluded from the sequestration proceedings. 
In order to create more inclusion for debtors with little or no income, South Africa should 
have debt relief mechanisms in place that specifically cater for NINA or LILA debtors. If the 
proposed Debt Relief Bill is enacted, this will provide NINA and LILA debtors with a route to 
obtain a discharge of debts after a period of one year.438 The Debt Intervention procedure 
however has a monetary cap of R50 000.439 It is submitted that this monetary cap should be 
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increased or disposed of so that more LILA and NINA debtors may access the procedure. It is 
further submitted that the suggested one-year discharge period should be extended to three 
years to avoid possible abuses of the system.440 The extended period will also serve an 
educational purpose and encourage better credit behaviour amongst low and no income 
earners.441 If the proposed Draft Insolvency Bill is enacted, it will also provide LILA and NINA 
debtors with an alternative debt relief mechanism.442 The pre-liquidation composition 
however has a monetary cap of R200 000. As per Coetzee’s suggestion, the pre-liquidation 
composition should draw from the proposal procedure in New Zealand, where there is no 
restriction on the amount of debt required to use the procedure.443 
In bringing South Africa’s Insolvency Act in line with the World Bank Report, it is 
recommended that South Africa should shorten the period for which an insolvent must wait 
before obtaining an automatic discharge. According to the Irish Law Reform Commission, a 
discharge period of twelve years is ‘excessively long and contrasts sharply with the fresh start 
principle which characterises modern insolvency codes’.444 South Africa’s Insolvency Act 
imposes an unduly restrictive and long discharge period of ten years.445 Even if the debtor 
complies with all the requirements necessary to be discharged, the High Court still has 
discretion on whether to allow the discharge. It is submitted that the ten-year discharge 
period is too long a period for a debtor to be subjected to the stigmatising status of insolvency 
and the restrictions that come with it. It is therefore recommended that South Africa should 
adopt the stance assumed in New Zealand and Ireland, whereby the debtor is automatically 
rehabilitated after a period of three years. This period is long enough to have an educational 
value but short enough to ensure that the debtor is not stuck with the insolvency status for a 
long period of time. It is further submitted that the discharge period should be suspended if 
the debtor fails to comply with his obligations. This is the position in England and Wales, and 
it encourages good behaviour, which is in line with the Report.   
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As previously mentioned, South Africa has two alternative debt relief mechanisms, namely 
debt review in terms of the NCA and administration orders in terms of the MCA.446 It is 
recommended that South Africa can learn from Chapter 13 of USA’s Bankruptcy Code447 and 
Special Civil Rehabilitation in terms of Japans Bankruptcy Act,448 where the repayment plan 
continues for a period of three years, but may be extended to five years, with the courts 
approval.449 The provisions of the NCA should be relaxed and section 74 of the MCA should 
be amended, to allow for the debtor to receive a discharge after three years, or after five 
years upon application by the creditor. This will create an incentive for debtors to enter into 
repayment plans and will assist in preventing abuse of the sequestration proceedings.  
The World Bank Report points out that debtors who have obtained debt relief should not be 
discriminated against.450 There is no provision in South African insolvency law which 
specifically protects debtors against discrimination. It is therefore submitted that the South 
African Insolvency Act should specifically protect debtors, who have entered into the 
sequestration process, against discrimination. A provision, similar to that in section 525 of 
USA’s Bankruptcy Code should be introduced.451 
In order to ensure that debtors avoid becoming excessively indebted in the future, the Report 
recommends debtor education and counselling.452 However, while these measures appear to 
be straight forward in theory, practically it is difficult to implement, as demonstrated by the 
mandatory debtor education introduced in the USA.453 The proposed Debt Relief Bill has made 
provision for the Minister to establish a financial literacy and budgeting skills programme.454 
It is still unclear how this proposed programme would operate in practice but, if it is well 
executed it will assist debtors to manage their financial affairs in order to avoid over-
indebtedness in the future. The Report also recommends the prohibition of repeat filing as a 
way to deter debtors from becoming indebted again in the future.455 In South Africa, the 
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insolvent has to wait a period of three years before they can reapply for a discharge.456 It is 
submitted that this period is too short to serve any educational value and thus to deter 
debtors from incurring debt again in the future. South Africa should adopt the stance taken 
in Japans bankruptcy laws, which requires the debtor to wait a period of seven years before 
filing for a discharge again.457  
According to the Report, as many debts as possible should be included in the discharge in 
order to be more effective.458 In South Africa, there are a wide range of debts included in the 
discharge.459 It is submitted that South Africa should not discharge debts arising from tax 
obligations. The Report states that evading this responsibility is unjustified.460 Fines and debts 
arising as a consequence of a crime should also be excluded from being discharged. This 
would prevent debtors from using the sequestration process to avoid criminal sanctions. 
Debts owing to secured creditors should also be excluded from being discharged, as seen in 
chapter 7 of USA’s Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy under the Insolvency Act (England and 
Wales).461 
If the South African legislature implements all of these recommendations, it would bring 
South Africa’s debt relief mechanisms in line with the discharge principles envisaged by the 
World Bank Working Group in its Report. This would be a step in the right direction for South 
Africa and South African debtors would not be trapped in a plight of debt. This would facilitate 
debtors’ economic rehabilitation to become productive members of society once again.  
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